

Message Text

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EXDIS MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOLLOWING REPEAT USNATO 537 ACTION SECSTATE INFO BONN GENEVA
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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF AND TO USNMR SHAPE
FOR GENERAL HAIG; USMISSION GENEVA FOR USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: NATO, MNUC, PARM

SUBJECT: FOLLOWING UP THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS TO THE
COUNCIL ON SALT AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES.

SUMMARY: WE BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES SHOULD MOVE
PROMPTLY TO FOLLOW UP THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS TO THE
COUNCIL REGARDING INTENSIFIED CONSULTATIONS ON SALT AND
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. AN EARLY US PROPOSAL FOR A NAC
EXPERTS GROUP TO EXPLORE SALT III AND RELATED THEATER
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL ISSUES WOULD HELP MEET ALLIED

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 013587

CONCERNS, WHILE PRESERVING FLEXIBILITY ON THE PACE AND
SUBSTANCE OF FUTURE CONSULTATIONS. WE NEED GUIDANCE ON
HOW WASHINGTON INTENDS TO PROCEED IN LIGHT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S REMARKS AND URGE ADOPTION OF THE APPROACH
OUTLINED BELOW. WE THINK IT IMPORTANT TO BE ABLE TO
POINT TO SOME CONCRETE FOLLOW-UP RESULTS AT THE SPRING
WASHINGTON SUMMIT. END SUMMARY.

1. WE SEE MERIT IN AN EARLY US INITIATIVE TO OUTLINE TO THE COUNCIL US PLANS TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT'S JANUARY 6 STATEMENT TO THE NAC THAT: "AS SALT II PROCEEDS TOWARDS AGREEMENT, WHICH WE HOPE WILL COME SOON, WE WILL INTENSIFY OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH ALL OF YOU, RECOGNIZING THAT THE COUNCIL IS THE FOCUS OF DELIBERATIONS. AS WE MOVE BEYOND SALT II, WE WILL UNDERTAKE BROAD DISCUSSIONS HERE ON ALLIED SECURITY ISSUES, INCLUDING GRAY AREA OR THEATER WEAPONS SYSTEMS. THESE GRAY AREA WEAPONS SYSTEMS ARE PROPERLY AN ALLIED CONCERN, AND THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO TREAT THEM IN THIS WAY, AT A PACE THAT BEST SUITS THE ALLIANCE."

2. THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS WERE TIMELY IN VIEW OF GROWING ALLIED CONCERN THAT FUTURE SALT NEGOTIATIONS COULD CONSTRAIN ALLIED OPTIONS AND THAT THEY NEED TO FIND A MEANS OF GREATER PARTICIPATION. AT THE DECEMBER MINISTERIALS, ALLIED COMMENTS UNDERSCORED A NEW LEVEL OF INTEREST IN FUTURE US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS. LEBER AND MULLEY, IN PARTICULAR, AT THE DPC STRESSED THE NEED FOR GREATER ALLIED PARTICIPATION AS REGIONAL SYSTEMS BECAME INVOLVED. ALL WHO SPOKE CONVEYED A SENSE OF URGENCY ABOUT PREPARING ALLIED POSITIONS IN VIEW OF THE US INTENTION TO BEGIN SALT III ON THE HEELS OF SALT II.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 013587

3. THUS, THE ALLIES EXPECT US TO FOLLOW THROUGH. WE CAN DO SO INITIALLY BY SUGGESTING PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT MIGHT BE ADOPTED FOR CONSULTATIONS PRECEDING THE OPENING OF NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION TALKS AFTER SALT II. SPECIFICALLY, WE BELIEVE THE US SHOULD PROPOSE MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL WITH EXPERTS TO INITIATE EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS ON ISSUES LIKELY TO BE RAISED AFTER SALT II, INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE ROLE IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS OF THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, AND HOW THE ALLIANCE INSTITUTIONALLY SHOULD APPROACH SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

4. ON TIMING, THE US SHOULD EXPRESS ITS READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN MEETINGS OF SUCH AN EXPERT GROUP AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, BUT IN ANY EVENT WELL IN ADVANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. THE FIRST MEETING COULD BE HELD SOME TIME FROM NOW. HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT, IN OUR VIEW, THAT WE TELL THE ALLIES PROMPTLY HOW WE PLAN TO PROCEED IN LIGHT OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, THAT WE OFFER THEM AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE THE ISSUES WITH US, AND THAT WE POINT TOWARD A MEANS OF GREATER PARTICIPATION WHERE THEIR INTERESTS ARE MORE DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

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5. AS FOR SUBSTANCE, IT SHOULD NOT BE NECESSARY, AT FIRST, TO GO BEYOND A STATEMENT OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ALLIES ON GRAY AREA ISSUES AND THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. AN INITIAL US PRESENTATION TO THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP NEED NOT GO BEYOND AN IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION, TOGETHER WITH A PRESENTATION OF SOME PRELIMINARY US VIEWS. THE US SHOULD NOT, THEREFORE, BE DISSUADED FROM DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS WITH THE ALLIES SIMPLY BECAUSE US THINKING ON THEM IS IN A PRELIMINARY STAGE.

6. A FEW ADDITIONAL POINTS:

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 013587

. -- THERE IS A SUBSTANTIVE LINK BETWEEN THE CONSULTATIONS DISCUSSED ABOVE AND THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE HIGH LEVEL GROUP THAT IS MEETING UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP. FOR SOME ALLIES, EXPERT PERSONNEL WOULD BE LARGELY THE SAME IN BOTH FORA. ISSUES SUCH AS THE SS-20 AND CRUISE MISSILES, KEY ALLIED CONCERNS IN SALT, ARE ALREADY BEING DISCUSSED IN THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP. WE WOULD SEE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THESE BODIES AS PRODUCTIVE, SINCE THE PACE AND DIRECTION OF WORK ON TNF SHOULD DOVETAIL WITH THE DIRECTION OF ALLIED THINKING ON THE ROLE OF TNF IN FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

. -- WHILE SOME, PARTICULARLY THE LARGER ALLIES, MAY WISH TO RESERVE THEIR DEEPEST CONCERNS TO BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE US, NATO CONSULTATIONS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTER US UNDERSTANDING OF THE FULL RANGE OF EUROPEAN THINKING AND HELP AVOID A SITUATION WHERE APPROACHES LIKELY TO SATISFY SOME ALLIES MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY BE CONTESTED BY OTHERS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN HIGH LEVEL GROUP PAPERS, THE UK HAS UNDERSCORED POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENTS OF DEEP STRIKE SYSTEMS IN THE THEATER WHILE DENMARK HAS REVEALED RESERVATIONS OVER SUCH A STEP.

. -- NATO CONSULTATIONS WOULD PROTECT THE US ABILITY TO CONDUCT NECESSARY BILATERAL AND RESTRICTED DISCUSSIONS OF SALT ISSUES WITH SELECTED ALLIES. THE FACT THAT INTENSIFIED CONSULTATIONS WERE SCHEDULED AT NATO WOULD NOT ONLY GIVE ALL ALLIES A SENSE OF PARTICIPATION, BUT WOULD ALSO REDUCE THE PROSPECT THAT ANY RESTRICTED TALKS WOULD BECOME THE FOCUS OF PRESS INTEREST AND OF ARTICLES (LIKE BURT IN THE NYT) WHICH JAR ALLIED SOLIDARITY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 013587

. -- INITIAL NATO DISCUSSIONS WILL LIKELY BE TENTATIVE AND WILL PROVIDE THE US WITH ADEQUATE LATITUDE AND TIME TO DEVELOP OR REFINED ITS OWN POSITION AS ALLIED THINKING EVOLVES.

7. IN SUM, THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL TO THE COUNCIL HAS SET THE STAGE FOR AN EARLY US INITIATIVE REGARDING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES ON POSSIBLE FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING REGIONAL SYSTEMS. WE BELIEVE THE US SHOULD SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY NOW BY ADVANCING A LARGELY PROCEDURAL INITIATIVE THAT WOULD SERVE TO REASSURE THE ALLIES AND GRADUALLY HELP TO EDUCATE THEM AND US IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS IN THIS AREA.

8. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE TO PROCEED ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED ABOVE. ALTERNATIVELY, WE WILL NEED GUIDANCE ON WHAT TO TELL THE ALLIES ABOUT HOW THE US INTENDS TO PROCEED IN VIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS. WE THINK IT IMPORTANT TO BE ABLE TO POINT TO SOME CONCRETE US FOLLOW-UP RESULTS AT THE MAY 30-31 WASHINGTON NATO SUMMIT. GLITMAN UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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